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FOREWORD 
 
 
 This FAO Fisheries Technical Paper has been compiled to complement the discussions of its companion 
volume: Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries Management1.  It thus 
provides a third volume of case studies on fisheries management practices published by FAO, which started with 
the collection of papers describing the management of elasmobranch fisheries2.  Further, it continues the series 
of publications on the use of Rights-based fisheries management undertaken by FAO’s Fisheries Department, 
which, together with the publication of this volume brings these publications to six in total3.  These reflect the 
growing importance of this topic to contemporary fisheries management. 
 
 The topic selected for this study, as with that for its companion volume, the Allocation of Transferable 
Quota Rights in Fisheries Management, arose from my oft-encountered experience when discussing this issue 
with fishermen and other ‘stakeholders’ in the fishing industry.  Uppermost in the minds of fishermen facing this 
possible form of management is “How much quota will I get?”  Immediately this question is resolved (of course 
providing an answer is never a trivial exercise!), the next most frequent question, “What is there to stop someone 
buying up all the quota and forming a monopoly?”  Less frequent has been the question from administrators, 
“Will introducing transferable fishing quota into the fishery solve the fleet overcapacity problems?” Never heard 
from fishermen is a question, which I have always thought was emminently reasonable: “Will there be any 
constraints on my rights to sell my quota holdings, for example, to whoever I wish?”  
 
 One common response I have encountered from fishermen (which would perplex a strictly utility-
maximizing economist) is that they do not think access to the fisheries they exploit should even be limited, 
though no such views on open-access existed, for example, in relation to their farms or woodlots whose potential 
harvests were obviously governed by a different cognitive rationality.  
 
 Another reason for compiling these case studies was to provide a factual basis for evaluating the claims, 
commonly made, that introducing individual transferable quotas (ITQs) leads to monopolies and the exclusion of 
small operators from fisheries.  Often, these claims are made with little or no substantiation and in journals 
whose editors and referees should know better.  In any event, the papers in this volume should partly remove the 
excuse for such non-substantiated claims.  I say “partly remove” because what many of the papers show is the 
great difficulty in accurately identifying what happens in terms of fleet-capacity when a transferable rights-based 
management approach is adopted. 
 
 Much of what happens to the fleet depends on factors not directly associated with the fishery undergoing 
the management change.  A further complication in determining if,  all of the changes that occur in a fishery 
after the introduction of a Rights-based Management system are the result of the new management regime, is 
practically impossible.  Fisheries, despite the suggestions of those who promote experimental adaptive 
management and because of their social and biological complexity, are too important to administer as an 
academic experiment.  Demand changes, supply changes, resource productivity changes (with consequential 
changes in operator's revenues), changes in factor costs (which usually only rise), superimposed on the business 
cycle and consumer product-substitution, make unequivocal conclusions about the effects of a particular 
management regime change a rarity.  While some changes may be unequivocally attributed to a new rights-based 
management regime, many others, particularly those relating to efficiency, will not. However, what is clear is 
that without monitoring, or at least good documentation, of both the pre- and post-management situations, 
unequivocal assertions (positive or negative) about the effects of transferable fishing-rights on fleet capacity can 
be dangerously misleading. 
 
                                                     
1 Shotton, R. (Ed.) 2001.  Case studies of the allocation of transferable quota rights in fisheries.  FAO Fish. Tech. Pap. 
No. 411. 373pp.   
2 Shotton, R. (Ed.) 1999.  Case studies of the management of elasmobranch fisheries.  FAO Fish. Tech. Pap. No. 378, Vols 1 
and 2. 
3 Earlier FAO publications are: 
Christy, F. 1982.  Territorial use rights in marine fisheries: Definitions and Conditions.  FAO Fish. Tech. Pap. No 227. 
Morgan, G.R. 1997.  Individual quota management in fisheries.  Methodologies for determining catch quotas and initial 
allocations.  FAO Fish. Tech. Pap. No. 371.  41pp. 
Shotton, R. 2000.  Use of property rights in fisheries management.  Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, Fremantle, 
Western Australia.  11-19 November 1999.  Vol.1: Mini-course lectures and Core Conference presentations.  FAO Fish. 
Tech. Pap. 404/1 (342pp).  Vol 2: Workshop presentations.  FAO Fish. Tech. Pap. 404/2  (468pp). 
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 While the interest of FAO’s Fisheries Department in the costs and benefits of introducing rights-based 
approaches to fisheries management was a major stimulus for undertaking the compilation and publication of 
these papers, there was another compelling reason to address this topic. The twenty-second Session of the FAO 
Committee on Fisheries (COFI), held in 1997, had urged that the issues of excessive fishing-capacity and 
fishing-effort leading to overfishing should be given consideration by FAO.  As a consequence the Fisheries 
Department organized a technical working group to review technical guidelines and consider an international 
plan of action for the management of fishing-capacity.  As part of the process of addressing this issue much work 
was focused on how to determine the “capacity” of fishing fleets and detailed actions were identified as to how 
individual countries could address this issue. 
 
 Little or no detailed consideration has yet been given to the role that rights-based approaches to fisheries 
management might provide in reducing fleet-capacity, though some countries reported at the twenty-third 
Session of COFI that individual transferable quotas were being used to reduce or prevent increases in fishing-
capacity.  By undertaking the documentation of experiences at the national and fishery level I hope this 
collection of case studies will provide a factual basis on which to consider rights-based management approaches 
as a possible solution for solving problems of excess fishing capacity.  Indeed, in my view, for many of the cases 
examined, a rights-based approach will provide the most practical remedy to the problems that exist, and at the 
same time will contribute to other desirable management objectives.  
 
 As those involved in managing fisheries are aware, day-to-day exigencies rarely allow the luxury of 
collecting detailed data that will permit the proper evaluation of new programmes (much less their soon-to-be-
replaced predecessors) and, as the papers in this volume show, this situation has been the norm.  Yet further, 
characterizing the “capacity” of a fishing fleet is a complex and difficult4, if not fruitless, task.  And, rarely have 
the authors had access to the detailed fleet-registry records that provide sufficient details on year of vessel 
construction, dates of vessel conversions or upgrades, design changes, engine upgrades, etc., all of which change 
the fishing capacity of individual vessels and thus the total for the fleet.  As has been well documented5, statistics 
based on aggregate fleet statistics can be meaningless in trying to predict the changes that may occur when 
individual vessels enter or leave a fishing fleet.  These vessels usually are the statistical outliers – those from the 
lower tail of the distribution of fishing success for vessels of similar dimensions.  Not surprisingly, the challenge 
of obtaining these detailed data has proven difficult for many of the studies and authors have often been forced to 
rely on other approaches. 
 
 Of great interest will be the accounts that relate to fisheries where the measure of effort has not been most 
appropriately a number of fishing vessels or a corresponding proxy.  Transferable quotas have also been 
introduced into other fisheries such as those for abalone where the effort is indicated by the number of divers.  
Readers should be interested to read of the experiences in these fisheries, which are most notably found in 
Australia. 
 
 The challenge of discerning overall or sectoral trends from the information provided in these papers is left 
to the reader.  But, so diverse are the fisheries that now use transferable quotas as a management tool, that no 
longer can writers be excused for making simplistic assertions based on poorly-conceived and subjective 
opinions derived from one or two examples of such management.  Such analysis ought be fisheries-specific and 
based on sector-based examination.  Enabling this is one of the objectives of this Technical Paper. 
 
 The contributing authors were asked to follow a common format so as to facilitate comparative analysis of 
different practices.  But, at the same time they were asked not to let this request limit their treatment of the topic.  
I emphasized that I would rather receive an appropriate treatment of the topic justified in terms of the problems 
of the unique fishery they were describing, than an account that was limited by attempting to follow my 
suggested structure of the paper.  Readers must understand the various conceptual elements that were involved 
and interpret for themselves the individual accounts in this light. 
 
 Observant readers of the companion volume, Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights 
in Fisheries  (FAO Fish. Tech. Pap. No. 411), will note that some fisheries covered in that volume have, for 
various reasons, not been addressed in this volume.  Among these lacunae is that for the South East Fishery of 
Australia.  However, I can direct interested readers to a recent publication, “Indicators of the effectiveness of 
quota markets: the South East Trawl Fishery of Australia”, in Volume 52(4) of, Marine and Freshwater 
                                                     
4 For example, see Gréboval, D. 1999.  Managing fishing capacity.  Selected papers on underlying concepts and issues.  FAO 
Fish. Tech. Paper No. 386.  206pp. 
5 For example, see Shotton, R. 1989.  An Analysis of Factors Affecting Catch Rates of Sub-65' Groundfish fishing vessels in 
4X/Sub-Area 5 of Southwest Nova Scotia.  Can. Tech. Rep. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 1707.  129pp. 
 v
Research.  This paper by Robin Connor and Dave Alden should provide much of the information about that 
fishery, which this volume attempts to address in other fisheries. 
 
 Once again, I must thank my secretary, Marie-Thérèse Magnan, for her enormous effort in preparing this 
paper for publication – her fourth in this series; my colleague, Mike Mann, in ensuring that the editorial quality 
of the papers is again of the highest standard, and Françoise Schatto, Publication Assistant, Fishery 
Information, Data and Statistics Unit for the difficult and unenviable responsibility of transforming the 
manuscript into the final document.  I also thank those who have generously made photographs available, 
usually to illustrate a paper that is not their own – I believe that these illustrations have done much to bring these 
reports “to life”.  Credit for the design and preparation of the cover goes entirely to Emanuela D’Antoni of our 
Service. 
 
 
Ross Shotton 
Marine Resources Service 
FAO, Rome. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This report, consisting of 16 national, or national fishery, studies, describes how the introduction of 
transferable fishing (effort) or fish (catch) quotas has affected the capacity of the fleet prosecuting the target 
fishery for which the harvesting rights apply. 
 
The case studies include two from the European Union (the U.K. and the Netherlands) and for Iceland.  
Two studies are presented for fisheries along the eastern seaboard of the United States Seven accounts are 
included from Australia, two of which describe fisheries managed by the Commonwealth Government 
through the Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement (the Northern Prawn Fishery and the fishery for 
southern bluefin tuna).  The other five accounts of Australian experiences describe the (unique?) Pilbara Trap 
Fishery in the northern region of Western Australia, Western Australia’s rock lobster fishery and the fishery 
for the same species and that for abalone and pilchards in South Australia.  In Tasmania an account is given 
for the rock lobster fishery while for New South Wales, a description is given for another invertebrate fishery, 
that for abalone. An omnibus account is given for the situation in New Zealand.  In the Western Pacific, 
accounts are given for the Pacific Halibut and Sablefish fisheries in Alaska, the marine trawl fisheries of 
British Columbia and for Patagonian toothfish in Chile.      
 
 
Keywords: Fisheries Management, Property Rights, ITQs, Individual Transferable Quotas, Fisheries Policy, 
Fleet Capacity, Fleet Capacity Reduction 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The UK fishing industry 
 The United Kingdom has a long history of fishing, reflecting its position as an island with a relatively long 
coastline and proximity to the productive fishing grounds of the European continental shelf (notably the North Sea, 
the English Channel and the West of Scotland). 
 The UK’s fisheries are heterogeneous and this is reflected in its complex fleet structure. The shape of the 
modern UK fleet is the product of technological and market changes together with political developments, in 
particular the loss of access to traditional distant-water grounds (particularly Iceland and Greenland) in the 1970s and 
the development of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) by the European Community (EC) (which the UK joined in 
1972). Under the CFP (see below) there have been national quotas for most stocks since the early 1980s, coupled 
with a succession of fleet-reduction programmes (the so-called MAGPs) or multi-annual guidance programmes. 
 There are currently just over 8000 fishing vessels in the UK, although nearly three-quarters of these are inshore 
boats of less than 10m in length. Table 1 shows the trend in vessel numbers for the period 1994 to 1999 by vessel 
type (the sector shown corresponds to the classification used by the EC for measuring fleet size). 
Table 1 
Number and type of UK fishing-vessels 1994-99 
Segment 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Pelagic 68 67 58 49 50 46 
Beam trawl  212  220  215  153  123  114 
Demersal trawl  1 644  1 549  1 451  1 428  1 318  1 235 
Lines/nets  300  267  224  214  187  172 
Shellfish mobile  206  194  265  227  241  243 
Shellfish fixed  305  283  339  352  311  301 
Distant-water  13  12  15  13  14  12 
Others  355  263  0  0  2  2 
Inshore (≤ 10m)  7 195  6 320  5 606  5 474  6 027  5 920 
Total  10 298  9 175  8 173  7 910  8 273  8 045 
 Source: MAFF UK Sea Fisheries Statistics. 
 The contraction of most of the over-10m sector of the fleet in terms of number, is not matched by an  equivalent 
decrease in capacity as vessels have become bigger and more powerful, particularly in the pelagic, beam trawl and 
demersal trawl segments.  Hatcher and Read (2001) consider the changes in fleet capacity in the context of the UK’s 
attempts to comply with MAGP targets. 
 Employment in fishing has declined 
somewhat during the 1990s from around 
21 000 to 18 000 jobs, but most of the 
decline has been in part-time employment. 
Full-time employment in fishing has been 
rather stable in recent years at around 
15 000. 
 Tables 2 and 3 show the total 
landings by weight and (nominal) value 
made by UK vessels during 1993-1999. 
 Cod, haddock and whiting are the main whitefish species caught by UK vessels and together they make up 
about 45% of the total demersal landings by weight and 36% by value. Other species landed in large quantities 
include ling, anglerfish, plaice, sand eels and blue whiting. Although classed as demersal the latter two species are 
fished by pelagic vessels and are the only species caught for reduction to meal. High-value demersal species caught 
Table 2 
Volume of landings by UK vessels (‘000 tonnes) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Demersal 359.2 371.6 386.0 407.7 426.1 456.7
Pelagic 393.8 388.9 396.3 343.9 323.2 334.4
Shellfish 104.6 114.4 129.5 140.6 142.0 132.7
Total 857.6 874.9 911.8 892.3 891.3 923.8
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Table 3 
Value of landings by UK vessels (£ millions nominal) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Demersal 356.4 364.8 369.4 383.5 368.5 372.2
Pelagic 56.4 58.4 64.3 90.0 88.4 113.8
Shellfish 113.6 138.2 156.4 163.0 165.0 175.4
Total 526.0 561.4 590.1 636.5 621.9 661.5
Source: MAFF UK Sea Fisheries Statistics. 
 
in smaller quantities include sole, hake and megrim. Herring and mackerel account for roughly 80% of pelagic 
landings by weight and value. The most important shellfish species are scampi or Dublin Bay prawn (Nephrops) 
(which now rivals cod as the most 
valuable catch), crabs and scallops, which 
together account for nearly three-quarters 
of the value of shellfish landings. 
 An increasing proportion of landings 
by UK vessels are made at ports in other 
EC or European Economic Area 
countries. In 1997 around half of all 
catches of herring and mackerel were 
landed abroad (mainly into Norway and 
Denmark), as were UK catches of hake 
(into Spain) and plaice (into the Netherlands)1.  Overall, some 38% of UK landings were made into non-UK ports. 
 Scotland accounts for 70% by weight and 60% by value of UK landings. The majority of the Scottish fleet 
operates from the East coats ports of Fraserburgh, Peterhead and, to a lesser extent, Aberdeen; the Shetland Islands 
are an important base for the pelagic fleet. The major fishing activity of the Scottish fleet is demersal trawling for 
whitefish and Nephrops, and pelagic trawling for species such as herring and mackerel. Scallop dredging is locally 
important in south-west Scotland and the Isle of Man. Scottish vessels primarily operate in the Northern North Sea 
(ICES area IVa) and the West of Scotland grounds (ICES area VI). There has been considerable development of the 
Scottish fleet during the 1990s with significant investment in new vessels and technology. Major advances that have 
had an impact on the efficiency of the fleet are the development of twin-rig and pair trawling. 
 The rest of the 
UK fleet is spread 
throughout England, 
Wales and Northern 
Ireland. The Northern 
Irish contribution is 
fairly small, and 
although locally 
important, there are 
only four ports with 
sizeable landings. The 
fishing fleet in 
Northern Ireland has 
contracted significantly 
since the early 1990s 
with a 27% decrease in vessel numbers. A similar contraction has been seen elsewhere in the UK.  The traditionally 
important ports of the Humber region on the north-east coast of England have been in steady decline and, although 
still very important in terms of transhipment and processing, the catching sector is barely represented in the local 
ports. The south-west of England, particularly Cornwall, has also seen reduced numbers of vessels during recent 
years, although the value of landings remains high in the region. 
 The UK fleet is diverse and there are fishing methods that are particular to certain regions. The predominant 
fishing methods in the South-West are beam trawling in the English Channel for sole and plaice, gill netting and 
trawling for high-value demersal species such as hake and megrim, and scallop dredging. The main markets are those 
of Newlyn, Brixham and Plymouth. Small-scale demersal trawling, gill-netting and crab/lobster potting is 
predominant in the English Channel. The North Sea fisheries of the East Coast include beam trawling for plaice and 
sole, but the predominant method is demersal trawling for whitefish such as cod and haddock. Also of great 
importance is the North Sea Nephrops fishery, fished mainly by small-scale demersal trawlers of under-24m.  The 
key markets are in Lowestoft (for beam trawlers), Grimsby, and to a lesser extent, Scarborough and Whitby. 
                                                 
1 In the case of hake and plaice the foreign landings reflect the foreign ownership of a significant part of the UK demersal fleet 
which is facilitated by the terms of EC membership. 
Atlantic Cod (Gadus morhua) 
An endangered resource in the North Sea 
Hatcher and Read 
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1.2 International context and management responsibilities 
 The United Kingdom is a member of the European Community and its marine fisheries must therefore be 
managed within the framework of the EC’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)2. Since 1983 the CFP has provided for 
the setting of annual total allowable catches (TACs) for most commercially important stocks within the overall zone 
of extended fisheries jurisdiction created by the 200-mile limits of those Member States bordering the North-East 
Atlantic and adjacent seas. The TACs are divided into national catch quotas according to an established allocation 
mechanism which gives each Member State a fixed percentage share each year (although a number of 
intergovernmental quota swaps are regularly and routinely undertaken). 
 Fishing opportunities in the waters of third countries and in international waters (such as the NAFO area in the 
North West Atlantic) are negotiated by the European Commission on behalf of the Community and are allocated to 
Member States in a similar way. 
 While national fleets fishing in Community waters are subject to certain common controls under the CFP (in 
particular technical conservation measures such as minimum mesh sizes) each Member State is able to determine the 
means for allocating its quotas to the national fleet and for regulating quota uptake3. EC rules nevertheless require all 
vessels of 10m or more in length to keep a logbook of their activities, which must include details of the quantities of 
TAC species caught and retained on board, and the time and location of capture4. Inshore vessels less than 10m long 
are not obliged to carry logbooks but Member States are still required to monitor their landings to ensure that national 
quota-limits are respected. 
 
2. USE RIGHTS AND THEIR TRANSFERABILITY 
 The historical development and detailed operation of the UK’s licensing and quota management systems are 
described in Hatcher and Read (2001). UK-registered commercial fishing vessels require a licence appropriate to the 
type of vessel and to the stocks targeted. As a general rule, quantitative restrictions on landings are imposed as 
licence conditions, but the majority of the offshore fleet belong to producers’ organisations (POs), which receive 
group-quota allocations from the Government (see below). For these vessels the licence conditions simply refer to the 
quota-management arrangements implemented by the PO to which they belong. The relatively small number of 
offshore vessels which operate independently have monthly landings-limits specified in their licences. Licences are 
issued annually by the Government Fisheries Departments5 but licence-entitlements can be transferred between 
vessels, subject to certain conditions, and between ownerships. 
 There are four main categories of fishing-vessel licences: category “A” licences for offshore vessels over 10m 
authorise fishing for all the commercially important stocks subject to quotas under the European Community’s 
common fisheries policy; category “B” licences authorise fishing by vessels over 10m for a smaller number of quota 
stocks6; category “C” licences authorise fishing by vessels over 10m for non-quota species only (principally 
                                                 
2 The CFP has four principal components: a common structural policy, a common market organization, a resource conservation 
and management system and an external policy (concerned with fisheries agreements with third countries). The common 
structural policy and the common organization of the market both date back to 1971 (two years before the UK joined the EEC). In 
addition to provisions for common structural actions (which include aids for fleet renewal as well as capacity reduction 
programmes) the structural regime lays down certain fundamental conditions for fishing, notably the principle of equal access of 
Member State’s fishing fleets to each other’s waters (beyond the six-mile territorial limit). The common market organization 
provides for a system of marketing standards, minimum prices and intervention arrangements (with compensation for products 
withdrawn from the market at minimum prices). In 1977 all the EC Member States in concert extended their fishery limits out to 
200 miles (except in the Mediterranean). Negotiations then began on a system to regulate catches within Community waters. 
Because of the difficulty of reaching agreement on national TAC shares the “conservation and management” system was not 
finally adopted until 1983. 
3 Article 9 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3760/92 establishing a Community system for fisheries and aquaculture (Official 
Journal of the European Communities, No L 389, 31.12.92, p.1). 
4 Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy 
(Official Journal of the European Communities, No L 261, 20.10.93, p.1). 
5 In the UK responsibility for the day-to-day management of fisheries is shared between the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (for fisheries in England), the Agriculture and Fisheries Departments of the Scottish Executive, Welsh Assembly and 
Northern Ireland. MAFF, however, remains the “lead” Department and takes overall responsibility for national policy and 
international responsibilities.  
6 The stocks available to holders of category B licences include those which were considered to be subject to lighter exploitation 
when the equivalent of category A licences were introduced in 1984. 
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shellfish). All vessels of 10m or under in length are issued with a special class of Category A licence7. 
 The licence system also controls vessel-capacity, measured in terms of GRT (in the process of conversion to the 
GT measure) and rated engine-power (in kW). Each licence carries an entitlement to employ a number of “vessel 
capacity units” (VCUs) which must match the number of units calculated for the vessel according to a standard 
formula8. If a licence is transferred to another vessel a VCU “penalty” is incurred (unless the recipient vessel is 
identical or has the same number of VCUs with a lower tonnage). The system also allows licences from a number of 
vessels to be aggregated onto a larger or more powerful vessel, again with an overall VCU penalty. 
 The capacity penalties and other licence-transfer rules have been altered a number of times since they were 
introduced ten years ago. The main rules are currently as follows: 
i. in general, licences cannot be “upgraded” by transfer or aggregation, i.e. vessels under-10m to vessels over-
10m, C to B, B to A, etc; also category A demersal species licences cannot be transferred onto pelagic vessels, 
and ordinary pelagic licences cannot be transferred to pelagic purse-seiners or freezer-trawlers9 
ii. a 10% penalty is imposed for most licence-transfers (except in the case of vessels 10m-and-under, and pelagic 
purser/freezer licences) 
iii. a 20% penalty is imposed for aggregating two licences and 30% for aggregating three or more licences (except 
in the case of pelagic purser and freezer licences, for which the penalty is 10%) 
iv. no licence transfers or aggregations may result in any increase in either total tonnage or engine-power10 and 
v. there is an exemption from the penalties, subject to certain conditions, for distant-water vessels. 
 A system for regulating the uptake of national quotas is linked to the licensing scheme. This involves the 
allocation of percentage quota-shares each year mainly to groups of vessels, although some individual vessel 
allocations are made by Government in the case of pelagic and distant-water stocks. Until 1998 these allocations were 
based on the track-record vessels’ landings during the previous three years (the reference period for the majority of 
stocks), but in 1999 this was replaced by a system of fixed-quota allocations (FQAs).  The allocations for 1999 and 
1998 were based on track records over the period 1994-1996 which was the reference period for the 1997 allocations 
(in order to avoid any inflation of track record over a qualifying period)11. The 1994-1996 track records were 
converted into allocations of “quota units” with an initial value of 100kg to produce the 1999 allocations. Although a 
“one-off” reallocation of units between licences was allowed for the 1999 allocations to let the POs resolve 
outstanding quota deals (see below), the allocations for 2000 and thereafter, in theory at least, should be the same as 
the 1999 allocations on a percentage basis, i.e. adjusted only according to changes in the UK quota allocations12. 
 In the case of the offshore (over-10m) fleet, each vessel, in effect, is given a set of notional individual quota 
allocations each year. By aggregating these individual notional quotas, group allocations are made by Government to 
Producers’ Organisations (POs)13 , which are then allowed to manage those allocations as they wish, for example, by 
means of monthly landings-limits from a common quota pool, or by allocating annual individual vessel- or company-
quotas14 . There are now 20 recognised POs in the UK representing roughly two-thirds of the fleet over 10m. The POs 
together account for some three-quarters of total landings by UK vessels and over 95% (by weight) of UK quota 
allocations in Community waters. 
                                                 
7 Within these main licence categories there are a number of specific licence types which apply to particular fisheries or which 
authorise fishing using certain types of vessel or gear. Category A or B beam trawl licences are required, for example, for the use 
of beam trawls by over 10m vessels in the North Sea and in Area VII (the English Channel and Western Waters) and specific 
licences are also required for the use of scallop dredges. There are special category A licences for pelagic purse-seiners and 
freezer-trawlers. There are also category “D” licences which authorise distant-water fishing. 
8 (overall length in metres x maximum breadth in metres) + (engine-power in kW x 0.45).  
9 However, there is a partial suspension of this rule for new pelagic freezer trawlers until 30 June 2001. 
10 In addition no aggregations of beam trawler licences may result in an engine-power in excess of 1,500kW and no aggregations 
of 10m and under licences may result in a VCU total of over 100. 
11 Sources indicate that the practice of artificially inflating track records, for example by over-recording landings or attributing 
catches to the wrong sea area (and hence stock), was widespread by 1996. 
12 The UK Government, however, reserves the right to issue or withdraw quota units. Because of the growing trading in quota 
between and within a number of the POs there is increasing pressure on the Government to allow annual reallocations. 
13 Producers’ Organisations are vessel owners’ associations recognised under EC law. Their primary role is the orderly marketing 
of fish and the implementation of common marketing rules and standards but they are encouraged to take on resource 
management responsibility. 
14 The management of quota allocations by the various UK producers’ organisations was surveyed in Hatcher, A.C. 1997, 
Producers’ organizations and devolved fisheries management in the United Kingdom: collective and individual quota systems, 
Marine Policy 21(6): 519-534. 
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 The quota-shares allocated to vessels that are not members of a PO (the so-called “non-sector”) are managed 
directly by the Government Fisheries Departments by monthly landings-limits. Uptake of the quota shares reserved 
for the inshore (10m and under) sector is not normally regulated unless the level of estimated landings dictates an 
early fishery closure, although increasing pressure on some inshore fisheries means that the use of monthly catch-
limits is likely to become routine for this sector too. 
 Quota is allocated in 100kg units and attached to the vessel’s licence, but individual-quota allocations remain 
entirely notional except for members of POs operating an IQ system, where the PO usually allocates each vessel an 
individual-quota based on its FQA. 
 As licences are transferred and aggregated, so are the FQAs attached to them. Clearly, however, there is no 
incentive for vessels to acquire notional-quota unless they can realise an individual quota-entitlement. Acquiring 
quota through the licence market is therefore only valuable for vessels which belong to a PO that operates an internal 
IQ system, although a “quota pooling” PO may not accept a new member unless he carries an adequate number of 
units. It is also not possible for (notional) quota to be divisible in movements between individual vessels through the 
licence transfer/aggregation system: FQA is transferred in its entirety. 
 The feature of the management system that greatly facilitates quota-trading is the relative freedom the POs have 
to exchange quota between themselves. As the quota management-system developed, POs were allowed to swap 
quota but initially all swaps had to balance in terms of “cod equivalents” (by value). This was later relaxed to allow 
non-balancing swaps, and then to allow “gifts”, i.e. one-way movements of quota. Although all quota movements are 
subject to Government approval, in practice POs can now trade quota between themselves in any quantity, and the 
Government takes no interest in any financial transactions that may accompany quota-exchanges or gifts. 
 Since quota can be traded between POs, it can effectively be traded between a member of one PO and a member 
of another PO, either “permanently” (a straight quota sale) or on an annual lease basis. Under the FQA system as it is 
presently configured, however, a sale of one tonne of quota from a vessel in one PO to a vessel in another PO 
necessitates the transfer between the POs of one tonne of quota each year in perpetuity. This assumes that no annual 
adjustments of vessels’ FQAs are permitted to take account of quota movements either between, or indeed within, 
POs (where quota-trading is obviously much more straightforward), which is the Government’s current stated policy. 
At the time of writing the Fisheries Departments have indicated that annual adjustments will not be allowed, but 
industry pressure may result in a change of policy. 
 A further significant feature of the UK quota management-system is that it is essentially an informal 
arrangement between Government and industry. Legislation provides for the issuing of fishing licences and for the 
attachment of certain conditions to those licences, including quantitative restrictions on landings. There is no legal 
basis, however, for the notional individual quota-allocations which are used to calculate group-allocations, they are 
merely an administrative tool used by the Government Fisheries Departments in the exercise of the Government’s 
discretionary right to issue licences in order to regulate sea fishing. Fishermen have no legal right to receive a licence 
nor any legal title to a share of national quotas15. 
 
3. MEASUREMENT AND ADJUSTMENT OF FISHING CAPACITY 
3.1 Objectives 
 UK policy on the measurement and adjustment of fishing-capacity is largely dictated by the fisheries structural 
policy of the EU16. This requires member states to adjust their fishing capacity in line with the EU’s so-called Multi-
Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs) which impose target levels of fleet capacity measured in terms of  gross 
tonnage (GT) and engine-power (in kW). Although the MAGPs date back to 1984, it was the third MAGP for 1993-
1996 that first imposed significant cuts in (nominal) fishing capacity on the EU member states. This section 
concentrates on the UK’s attempts to meet the objectives of MAGP III through a combination of measures, including 
a series of annual decommissioning schemes and the licence “market”. Reference is also made to MAGP IV, which 
covers the period 1997-2001. It should be appreciated that the nominal capacity-reductions required under the 
MAGPs are dictated simply (and more or less pro rata) by biological estimates of excess fishing mortality for the 
various exploited stocks. 
 The MAGPs divide fishing fleets up by sector, with each segment by and large being defined according to 
fishing method, although in some cases sectors are distinguished by vessel size or target species. Targets must be 
achieved for each sector as well as overall.  For the UK the third MAGP, approved by the European Commission in 
                                                 
15 Legal opinion, however, suggests that in the event of a challenge a fisherman may well have claim to a “legitimate expectation” 
of quota. 
16 See Hatcher, A.C. 2000, Subsidies for European fishing fleets: the European Community’s structural policy for fisheries 1971-
1999, Marine Policy 24(2): 129-140. 
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December 1992, required the UK Government to achieve an overall cut in the size of the registered fishing fleet from 
214 733GRT and 1 228 922kW (the reported situation at 1 January 1992) to 173 455GRT and 995 627kW  by  31 
December 199617. These figures represented overall reductions of 19.2% in GRT and 19.0% in engine-power 
(measured in kW)18. The UK’s targets were however amended in June 1995: the reductions required for the 
“Nephrops trawl” and “shellfish mobile” fleet-segments were relaxed in the light of information supplied by the 
Government to the Commission on the rates of by-catch of demersal species by these segments19. As a result, the 
overall reductions required for the UK fleet as a whole were reduced slightly to 17.6% in GRT and 17.4% in engine-
power. 
 Table 4 summarises the original and revised objectives for each of the UK fleet-segments under MAGP III. It 
can be seen  that the biggest cuts were required for the  “beam trawl”  and the  “demersal trawl and seiners” 
segments. For other segments the cuts required were intended only to take account of the effects of technical 
progress.  Under the terms of MAGP III, up to 45% of the overall reductions required could be achieved by 
reductions in activity (measured in terms of days at sea)20. 
 
Table 4 
UK objectives by fleet-segment under MAGP III 
Fleet segment  Situation 
at 
1.1.92 
Original 
objective 
for 31.12.96 
Initial % 
reduction 
required 
Amended 
objective 
for 31.12.96 
Final % 
reduction 
required 
GRT 25 178 22 633 10.1% 22 633 10.1% Pelagic trawl 
kW 80 858 72 060 10.9% 72 060 10.9% 
GRT 23 062 17 621 23.6% 17 621 23.6% Beam trawl 
kW 107 542 81 465 24.2% 81 465 24.2% 
GRT 71 956 51 746 28.1% 51 746 28.1% Demersal trawl and 
seiners kW 368 194 262 505 28.7% 262 505 28.7% 
GRT 18 140 13 860 23.6% 16 306 10.1% Nephrops trawl 
kW 100 142 75 859 24.2% 89 246 10.9% 
GRT 12 121 10 896 10.1% 10 896 10.1% Netters liners and 
other static gears kW 58 503 52 137 10.9% 52 137 10.9% 
GRT 6 007 4 320 28.1% 5 400 10.1% Shellfish mobile 
kW 34 725 24 757 28.7% 30 947 10.9% 
GRT 2 636 2 370 10.1% 2 370 10.1% Shellfish fixed 
kW 18 397 16 395 10.9% 16 395 10.9% 
GRT 10 987 9 876 10.1% 9 876 10.1% Distant-water 
kW 23 829 21 235 10.9% 21 236 10.9% 
GRT 24 438 21 968 10.1% 21 968 10.1% Mixed (non-trawlers) 
<10m kW 304 630 271 484 10.9% 271 484 10.9% 
GRT 20 208 18 165 10.1% 18 165 10.1% Others >10m 
kW 132 102 117 728 10.9% 117 728 10.9% 
GRT 214 733 173 455 19.2% 176 981 17.6% Total 
kW 1 228 922 995 627 19.0% 1 015 204 17.4% 
Note: The figures for the fleet situation at 1.1.92 do not include vessels registered in the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands 
(estimated to represent an additional 2 500 GRT and 33 000kW at the time); the objectives  however  do include this part of 
the UK fleet. 
3.2 Implementation 
3.2.1 Technical measures 
 In February 1992 the UK Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food announced a package of measures 
designed to “reduce fishing effort over the period up to 1996, to meet a target which we shall need to quantify and  
                                                 
17 Commission Decision 92/593/EEC (OJ No L 401, 31.12.92, p33). 
18 The MAGPs adopted at the end of 1992 took into account the objectives for the transitional guidance programmes for 1992: see 
Commission Decision 92/363/EEC (OJ No L 193, 13.7.92, p25) in the case of the UK. 
19 Commission Decision 95/243/EC (OJ No L 166, 15.7.95, p21). 
20 In the 1995 amended MAGPs “fishing effort” was defined by the Commission in GT x days and kW x days, GT to be estimated 
by the Commission according to the provisions of Commission Decision 95/84/EC (OJ No L 67, 25.3.95, p33). 
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agree with the Commission in line with our Community obligation under the 1992-1996 Multi-Annual Guidance 
Programme”21. These measures were to include the following: 
i. the introduction of (tradeable) days-at-sea entitlements 
ii. a series of annual decommissioning schemes 
iii. increased capacity penalties for fishing-vessel licence-transfers and aggregations and 
iv. the extension of restrictive licensing to vessels of 10m-or-under. 
 At the time the Government estimated that around a 5-6% reduction in capacity would be achieved through the 
decommissioning scheme, and that other measures would achieve the balance of the reductions required to meet the 
1996 MAGP targets. 
3.2.2 Days-at-sea limitation 
 At the end of 1992 new primary legislation was enacted to enable days-at-sea entitlements to be attached to 
fishing-vessel licences, and secondary legislation to establish the general rules for days allocations was put in place in 
May 199322. The Government had originally planned to freeze effort at 1991-levels in 1993, and then to reduce it as 
necessary in the years 1994-1996, depending on the contribution of other measures to overall capacity-reduction23. 
Under the terms of MAGP III, a reduction of 8.6% in overall fleet activity could have been made to contribute a 45% 
achievement of the final objectives. 
 However, opposition from the fishing industry led first  to a postponement of the scheme’s implementation until 
1994, and then to an indefinite suspension following a legal challenge by the National Federation of Fishermen’s 
Organisations, which was referred by the British High Court to the European Court of Justice. In October 1995 the 
Court found in favour of the UK Government, but the Government decided against trying to reintroduce the scheme 
at this time (ostensibly because of the introduction in 1996 - in principle at least - of effort-limits for all Community 
vessels over-18m fishing in Western waters). 
3.2.3 Decommissioning schemes 
 It was originally intended that a decommissioning scheme would run for two years with a total (gross) budget of 
£25m. In June 1994 the scheme was extended for a third year, and in January 1995 it was extended until the 1997-98 
financial year with the total budget being increased to £53m24. 
 The key operational features of the decommissioning schemes were as follows: (a) vessel owners were invited 
to submit tenders for compensation, which were ranked in terms of £ per vessel-capacity unit withdrawn25; 
(b) successful applicants had to surrender their licences and the vessels had to be scrapped after de-registration 
(despite the other options under EC rules of disposal outside the Community, or use for purposes other than fishing); 
and (c), eligible vessels had to be UK-registered (not registered in the Isle of Man or Channel Islands), seaworthy 
(with appropriate safety certificates if necessary) and over 10m in length. In order to be consistent with EC rules, 
grants were also limited to vessels that were at least ten years old. It was the responsibility of the vessel owner to 
supply proof of scrapping by the required date (and so, by implication, to bear all of the costs involved in scrapping 
the vessel). 
 The first scheme was announced in May 1993. In addition to the general rules outlined above, the following 
criteria were applied: 
i. the vessel must have been fishing for at least 100 days in 1991 and in 1992 and 
ii. the vessel’s licence had to be no less restrictive in terms of the stocks authorised than at 27.2.92 (the date of 
the first announcement of the decommissioning schemes). 
 The rules for the 1994-scheme were modified in order to target vessels fishing for the most sensitive stocks (and 
those in the fleet-segments requiring the largest cuts) and to exclude distant-water vessels. The detailed criteria were 
now as follows:  
i. the vessel must have been fishing in Community waters for at least 100 days in 1992 and in 1993 as a UK-
registered vessel and 
ii. the vessel’s licence had to be a “full pressure stock licence” (the old equivalent of a category A licence). 
                                                 
21 MAFF News Release No 73/92, 27.2.92. 
22 Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1992; Sea Fish Licensing (Time at Sea) (Principles) Order 1993. 
23 MAFF News Release No 73/92, 27.2.92. 
24 MAFF News Release No 227/94, 15.6.94, and No 23/95, 18.1.95. 
25 The Government rejected the option of simply paying flat-rate compensation payments up to the maxima allowed under EU 
rules as being unlikely to produce value for money. 
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An early example of an early Scottish purse seiner that would have 
depended on a producer’s organization for its quota entitlement 
For the 1995-scheme the prawn (Nephrops) trawlers were excluded as were other shellfish boats, because these 
segments were considered to have already met their MAGP targets. The detailed criteria were now: 
i. the vessel must have been fishing in Community waters (or Norwegian waters south of 62˚N) for at least 
100 days in 1993 and in 1994 
ii. the vessel’s licence had to be a category A or category B licence (or category C with certain individual species 
entitlements) and 
iii. the vessel should not have been predominantly involved in the Nephrops fishery in 1994. 
 The eligibility rules announced for the 1996 scheme were relaxed to include all vessels over 10m in length, 
including distant-water vessels and prawn trawlers. The criteria were now simply: 
i. the vessel must have been fishing for at least 75 days (the EC minimum) in 1994 and in 1995 and 
ii. the vessel had to have a valid licence. 
 During consultations on the terms of the 1996-scheme, the Government proposed that the owners of 
decommissioned vessels should be allowed to retain their landings track-records, to be transferred to another vessel or 
sold, thus encouraging lower bids. The industry, however, rejected this option at the time. 
 Although MAGP III finished at the end of 1996, the 1997-scheme was designed to make up any shortfall under 
MAGP III. The main changes in the eligibility criteria were that applications were once more restricted to vessels 
with category A licences, and that Nephrops trawlers were again excluded (the Government left open the option of 
excluding vessels from other segments which were found to have met their MAGP targets). Most significantly, the 
industry had by now agreed that landings track-records could be retained by owners who decommissioned their 
vessels. 
3.2.4 Licensing 
 The UK Government clearly hoped that the fishing-vessel licensing-system would make a significant 
contribution to reducing fleet-capacity in line with the MAGP III targets, in particular through increased capacity 
penalties for licence transfers and aggregations, and through administrative changes designed to limit the expansion 
of certain fisheries. 
 The UK licensing-system was and remains complex, having evolved in largely a piece-meal manner since 1984 
as new restrictions were introduced in order to control the growth of various fisheries (and, in some cases, to try and 
limit the size of the Spanish- and Dutch-owned sectors). 
 By 1992, restrictive licensing applied to all vessels over-10m but still did not apply to vessels of 10m-or under. 
Following a period in which there were rather complicated restrictions on transferability, most licences had since 
1990 been transferable both between vessels and between owners, but capacity penalties (described in Section 2. 
above) were incurred whenever licences were transferred or aggregated. A number of licensing measures were 
introduced during this period as follows: 
i. In 1992 the aggregation of pressure stock licences onto beam trawlers in ICES Area IV was dis-allowed, and 
the VCU penalty for all transfers and aggregations was increased to 20%. 
ii. In 1993 restrictive-licensing was extended to the sector 10m-and-under. The VCU penalty was again reduced to 
10% for aggregations where the increase in engine-power was no more than 15% and for all over-10m licence-
transfers. There was to be no penalty applied to transfers of vessels 10m-and-under (no increase in VCUs was 
allowed) but no licence-transfers 
from vessels 10m-and-under to 
vessels over-10m, or 
aggregations combining both 
under-10m and over-10m 
licences were permitted. In 
addition, no more than two 
vessels in the 10-17m band could 
be involved in aggregations. 
From 1993 it was also no longer 
possible to retain indefinitely a 
licence entitlement that was not 
actually assigned to a vessel. 
iii. In 1995 the overall structure of 
the licensing system was revised. 
All licences were now fully 
transferable independently of 
vessels, but still as a general rule 
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only similar licences could be aggregated. An exception was made for purse-seiners and freezer-trawlers which 
could receive demersal licences for engine modifications up to +15% with a 10% VCU penalty. Also in 1995 
the penalty for aggregating three or more licences was increased to 30% (except in the case of purse-seiners and 
freezer-trawlers), aggregations of more than two licences between 10-17m were now permitted, and Area IV 
beam trawl licences could now be aggregated if the resultant engine-power did not exceed 1500kW. Another 
significant change at this time was that vessels’ landings track-records (which were normally assessed over the 
previous three years) were now attached to the licence rather than the vessel. 
iv. Early in 1996 it was announced that no further licence transfers or aggregations would be allowed which would 
increase either tonnage or engine-power, and that no aggregations of vessels 10m-and-under would be allowed 
to result in a VCU total of more than 100. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Progress of MAGPs 
The data in Table 5 are taken from the European Commission’s report on the progress of the MAGPs at the end 
of 199626. They are based on the Community fleet register but take account of the UK Government’s reallocation of 
vessels from the “others” segment27. From the Table it appears that at the end of 1996 for the UK fleet there was still 
an overall reduction-backlog of some 5.0% in GRT and 2.9% in engine-power, but for certain fleet-segments the 
deficit was more significant, in particular for the segments: beam trawl, demersal trawl, and shellfish (fixed). Because 
of discrepancies between the UK register and the Community register, however, which affected the figures for 1992 
as well as 1996, this situation was a provisional result. 
Table 5 
UK progress towards MAGP III targets 
Fleet segment  Situation at 
1.1.92 
Situation at 
31.12.96 
Revised 
objective for 
31.12.96 
% reduction 
still 
required 
GRT 25 178 27 132 23 541 13.2% Pelagic trawl 
kW 80 858 73 896 77 955 -- 
GRT 23 062 20 966 18 393 12.3% Beam trawl 
kW 107 542 109 259 86 467 20.9% 
GRT 71 956 64 111 57 559 10.2% Demersal trawl and 
seiners kW 368 194 323 184 300 176 7.1% 
GRT 18 140 14 350 18 123 -- Nephrops trawl 
kW 100 142 83 820 101 018 -- 
GRT 12 121 14 588 12 712 12.9% Netters liners and other 
static gears kW 58 503 54 738 63 910 -- 
GRT 6 007 8 110 8 125 -- Shellfish mobile 
kW 34 725 45 558 48 606 -- 
GRT 2 636 5 839 5 094 12.8% Shellfish fixed 
kW 18 397 36 539 34 054 6.8% 
GRT 10 987 7 107 9 876 -- Distant-water 
kW 23 829 18 120 21 236 -- 
GRT 24 438 19 577 21 968 -- Mixed (non-trawlers) 
<10m kW 304 630 264 868 271 482 -- 
GRT 20 208 0 0  Others >10m 
kW 132 102 0 0  
GRT -- 2 760 --  Unclassified 
kW -- 24 518 --  
GRT 214 733 184 539 175 391 5.0% Total 
kW 1 228 922 1 034 498 1 004 903 2.9% 
Notes: 1992 figures from amended MAGP III for the UK (Commission Decision 95/243/EC); the 1996 figures are from the 
Community register and still do not include all vessels registered in the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands (see text). 
                                                 
26 COM(97) 352 final, 11.7.97. 
27 The Community register at that time still did not contain a complete record of vessels registered in the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man. 
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More up-to-date figures on the situation at the end of MAGP III are given in the decision on MAGP IV, which 
was approved at the end of 199728  (although these figures are still subject to revision because of the transition from 
GRT to GT as the common measure of vessel tonnage). These figures are shown in Table 6. Direct comparison with 
Table 5 is difficult because of the change from GRT to GT, the grouping of certain fleet segments and further 
adjustments to the UK register. Nevertheless, it is clear that by this stage that the overall objectives for MAGP III had 
more or less been met, but significant deficits remained in certain fleet segments, most notably the beam trawl 
segment. Table 6 also shows the capacity figures for the beginning of 1998 and the objectives which the UK is 
supposed to meet by the end of 2001 under MAGP IV29. 
Table 6 
UK progress towards MAGP III targets (MAGP IV figures) 
Fleet segment  Situation 
at 1.1.97 
Revised 
objective for 
31.12.96 
Situation 
at 1.1.98 
Objective for 
31.12.01 under 
MAGP IV 
GT 37 453 34 876 41 220 34 876 Pelagic trawl and purse seines 
kW 71 876 82 168 69 757 82 168 
GT 28 240 26 062 26 323 26 062 Beam trawl 
kW 117 616 103 054 106 143 103 054 
GT 116 581 120 630 115 468 120 630 Demersal trawls  seines and 
Nephrops trawls kW 400 127 422 876 390 150 422 876 
GT 16 431 15 854 16 282 14 538 Netters  liners and other static 
gears kW 51 977 67 364 51 550 61 744 
GT 11 766 11 615 10 197 11 552 Shellfish mobile 
kW 55 648 51 232 46 872 50 958 
GT 6 413 6 267 7 305 6 242 Shellfish fixed 
kW 44 463 35 895 49 512 35 768 
GT 15 567 14 883 15 829 14 883 Distant-water 
kW 25 400 23 741 25 004 24 281 
GT 20 120 21 901 19 991 21 901 Small-scale coastal (<10m) 
kW 286 367 286 154 287 554 286 154 
GT 252 571 252 088 252 615 250 684 Total 
kW 1 054 474 1 072 484 1 026 542 1 066 463 
Notes: the 1997 GT figures include some estimations and are therefore subject to revision; the 1996 GRT objectives were 
converted to GT according to the relationship between GT and GRT for the fleet at 1.1.97. 
3.3.2 Decommissioning 
 The four decommissioning schemes operated during 1993-96 removed a total of 578 vessels over-10m from the 
UK fleet, representing 19% of the 1992 total of 3036 vessels over 10m. Table 7 shows the capacity withdrawn by 
segment, compared to the 1992 situation, and the 1996 objectives as specified in the 1995 amended MAGP for the 
UK. Because of the adjustments to the UK register during 1996-7, these are probably the most appropriate 
comparisons available. 
It is apparent that while the decommissioning schemes removed around a half of the required tonnage,  they 
removed only one third of the required engine-power. Certain fleet segments (Nephrops-trawlers, shellfish-mobile 
and shellfish-fixed) were clearly over-represented in the decommissioning process, while other segments were under-
represented. 
The total gross expenditure on the 1993-6 schemes was £36.24m. The 1997-scheme, which cost around £14.3m, 
removed a further 108 vessels and 4406 GRT30. At the time of writing details of the capacity removed under this last 
scheme are not currently available. 
3.3.3 Fishing vessel licensing 
The only data presently available on the effects of licence-transfers and aggregations over the period 1992-1996 
come from a 1997 report on the decommissioning schemes undertaken for the UK Government31.  No data are 
                                                 
28 Commission Decision 98/124/EC (OJ No L 39, 12.2.98, p34). 
29 COM(99) 175 final, 27.04.99. 
30 MAFF News Release No 383/97, 3.12.97. 
31 Economic Evaluation of the Fishing Vessels (Decommissioning) Schemes. Report to the UK Fisheries Departments. Nautilus 
Consultants, Edinburgh, September 1997. 
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currently available on transactions concerning vessel-licences 10m-and-under in the inshore sector, or the results of 
licence-transfers and aggregations since 1996. 
During the period a total  of 397 transactions involving vessels over-10m (measured in terms of the number of 
recipient vessels) resulted in a reduction of 39 737kW (17%) from the donor licence total of 232 478kW. This 
represented some 19% of the overall reduction in engine-power required under MAGP III (based on the 1995 
amended targets). The contribution of licence transfers and aggregations in terms of tonnage is not known because of 
changes from GRT to GT, and because the VCU system does not take account of vessel tonnage directly. 
Table 7 
Capacity withdrawn by decommissioning 1993-1996 
Fleet segment  Situation 
at 1.1.92 
Amended 
objective 
for 
31.12.96 
% 
reduction 
required 
Nominal 
capacity 
with-
drawn 
% 1992 
capacity 
with-
drawn 
GRT 25 178 22 633 10.1% 437 1.7% Pelagic trawl 
kW 80 858 72 060 10.9% 850 1.1% 
GRT 23 062 17 621 23.6% 2 138 9.3% Beam trawl 
kW 107 542 81 465 24.2% 9 791 9.1% 
GRT 71 956 51 746 28.1% 6 916 9.6% Demersal trawl and seiners 
kW 368 194 262 505 28.7% 25 805 7.0% 
GRT 18 140 16 306 10.1% 5 174 28.5% Nephrops trawl 
kW 100 142 89 246 10.9% 17 134 17.1% 
GRT 12 121 10 896 10.1% 841 6.9% Netters liners and other 
static gears kW 58 503 52 137 10.9% 3 849 6.6% 
GRT 6 007 5 400 10.1% 713 11.9% Shellfish mobile 
kW 34 725 30 947 10.9% 4 539 13.1% 
GRT 2 636 2 370 10.1% 697 26.4% Shellfish fixed 
kW 18 397 16 395 10.9% 3 735 20.3% 
GRT 10 987 9 876 10.1% 228 2.1% Distant-water 
kW 23 829 21 236 10.9% 1 214 5.1% 
GRT 24 438 21 968 10.1% 0 0.0% Mixed (non-trawlers) 
<10m kW 304 630 271 484 10.9% 0 0.0% 
GRT 20 208 18 165 10.1% 500 2.5% Others >10m [non-
active/unknown] kW 132 102 117 728 10.9% 3 209 2.4% 
GRT 214 733 176 981 17.6% 17 643 8.2% Total 
kW 1 228 922 1 015 204 17.4% 70 126 5.7% 
Notes: 1992 figures and 1996 targets as in 1995 amended MAGP; data on decommissioned vessels from MAFF  published in 
Nautilus Consultants (1997). 
In terms of engine-power at least (again calculations for tonnage are difficult because of the re-measurement/ 
estimation in terms of GT and the lack of tonnage figures for the licence contribution) decommissioning and licence 
penalties together removed around 71% of the observed decrease in the size of the fleet over-10m from 1992 to 1996 
(45% by decommissioning, 26% through licence transactions). It is difficult to say how the remaining 29% was 
achieved, although some of the apparent decrease is almost certainly due to administrative adjustments to the UK 
register. 
 
4. CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSFERABLE USE RIGHTS 
4.1 Licence and quota trading 
Obtaining comprehensive and reliable data on licence-trading in the UK is extremely difficult, since the 
Government takes no interest in the financial transactions that accompany licence-transfers, and all trading takes 
place privately either directly or via licence brokers. The Government also does not routinely produce statistics on 
licence-transfers and aggregations. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the volume of licence and quota-trading has 
increased greatly since 1995. 
 The report on the UK decommissioning schemes 31 investigated trends in licence/track-record prices during the 
period of MAGP III.  Data was obtained from licence-brokers showing that in early 1997 track-record prices (as a 
component of total licence values) ranged from £350/t for herring, to £1200/t for cod, and up to £10 000/t for sole. 
The figures are reproduced in Table 8 below.  The consultants also obtained data on licence prices over the period 
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1993-1996. These figures are summarised in Table 9 (with the pre-1995 licence-types expressed in terms of their 
current equivalents). 
 It is difficult to interpret the apparently chaotic price movements during 1993-1995, but the big jump in the 
prices for category A licences (which authorise fishing for all quota stocks) from 1995 to 1996 reflects the marked 
strengthening of demand for licences which started to occur around this time. 
Table 8 
Average track-record prices in 1997 
Species £ per tonne 
cod 1 200 
plaice 1 200 
saithe 2 500 
hake 2 000 
monkfish (anglers) 3 300 
sole 6 000 to 10 000 
herring 350 
mackerel 700 
  
Table 9 
Average licence prices (per VCU) 1993-1997 
Licence type £ per VCU 
category 1993 1994 1995 1996 
A 179 269 184 776 
A purser na 395 na 2 083 
A beam trawl 700 391 276 1 222 
B 62 189 88 182 
C 47 na na 184 
 
 The report (1997) considered only that there was “some evidence” of quota-leasing arrangements between PO 
members. We find that in recent years quota-leasing and selling within and between POs has grown significantly in 
importance. A report for the Scottish Whitefish Producers Association32, which represents the majority of catching 
power in the Scottish demersal fleet, found that almost a third of the Scottish fleet had bought quota in some form or 
other during the conversion of rolling track records to FQAs. Leasing, although becoming more widespread, was less 
prevalent at the time, with less than 10% of vessels leasing quota. This number, however, is still much greater than 
seen in previous years, when the only leasing that had taken place was between Dutch-owned vessels in the North 
Sea Fishermen’s Organisation and in the Fife Fish Producers Organisation, which had already had experience of this 
while operating under the Dutch ITQ system. The same report indicated that the ten or so quota-trading and leasing 
arrangements currently in operation would increase rapidly, as skippers coming up for retirement opt to keep their 
quota entitlements and lease them out. 
 The average quota-prices given in Table 10 were obtained from the records of a company representing a 
significant proportion of the quota-trading in the UK.  This company remarked that the prices of a number of stocks 
were largely driven by purchases by foreign-owned vessels (so-called “quota-hoppers”), with Spanish interests 
buying quota for monkfish (angler) and hake, and Dutch-owned companies buying quota for North Sea sole and 
plaice. 
4.2 Impact of trading on fleet structure 
 We estimated previously that from 1992-96 around 45% of the observed decrease in the capacity of the fleet 
over-10m (in terms of engine-power in kW) was attributable to decommissioning, while around 26% was achieved 
through the capacity-penalties applied to licence-transactions.  
 The figures for the UK fleet for  the beginning of 1997 (from Table 6) and the latest figures available from the 
Ministry are shown in Table 11.  There has been a 3% overall increase in registered tonnage and a 7% decrease in 
rated engine-power33.  However, this result masks some significant changes in the capacity of certain fleet segments. 
                                                 
32 Problems Associated with trading in fish quota: solutions for the benefit of the fishery and dependent communities.   Report 
prepared for the SWFPA by Rodgers, P. The Centre for Fishery Economics Research, December 1999. 
33 At the time of writing efforts are underway to tighten up the measurement of engine-power which may result in an increase in 
the measured total. 
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For example, the tonnage of the pelagic sector increased by 27%, while the beam trawl sector decreased by 13% in 
GT and 22% in engine-power. 
Table 10 
Average quota-prices (per tonne) 1995-2000 
Quota stock £ per tonne 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 01/1999 08/1999 01/2000 
NS cod 250 400 1 000 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 200 
NS haddock    1 000 1 200 1 800 3 000 
NS plaice  1 800 2 000 1 800 1 500 1 500 1 200 
NS sole  10 000 10 000 8 000 8 000 8 000 10 000 
NS anglers    2 500 2 400  2 200 
NS Nephrops    1 500 2 500  3 500 
WOS anglers    3 500 5 500  6 000 
WOS Nephrops    700 1 800  2 000 
VIIa sole     7 000  6 000 
VIIe sole     7 000  9 000 
VIIfg sole     8 000  9 000 
VIIa plaice     1 000  1 000 
VIIde plaice     1 200  1 200 
VI/VII hake    2 500 3 500  4 500 
VII anglers    2 500 3 500  5 000 
VII Nephrops    1 000 1 500  1 700 
NS = North Sea (ICES area IV); WOS = West of Scotland (ICES area VI); VII = ICES Area VII. 
 Despite the lack of data on licence-transfers and aggregations during 1997-99 it is apparent that  the licence 
market has not resulted in any significant overall rationalisation of fleet capacity during the last two years, although 
there has been some reallocation of capacity-entitlements between sectors and some reduction in licence/vessel 
numbers (see Table 1). The ability to “strip” licences during the move to FQAs in 1998 may nevertheless have 
assisted the rationalisation of the UK fleet. Abuse of the VCU system, with many new vessels built since 1996 under-
declaring their engine-power, is now accepted to be widespread. The Government, realising the widespread extent of 
the problem, recently announced steps to ensure compliance with the regulations. Vessel owners have until 30 June 
2000 to admit to any power “irregularities”, after which they will have 4 years to obtain the required VCUs. The 
existence of a number of “stripped” licences, bought from ageing vessels by quota-traders during the move to FQAs 
in 1998, has provided a ready source of VCUs for those vessels wishing to become legitimate, without the added 
difficulty of buying quota that they could not afford and did not require. The “disappearance” of the tonnage 
associated with these licences when they are amalgamated onto existing vessels, may well form a significant 
component of the tonnage-reduction required under MAGP IV. 
 The increasing trade in licences certainly had an effect on the operation of the 1992-97 decommissioning 
schemes, as did the decommissioning schemes on the licence market, by reducing the overall supply of licences and 
injecting liquid capital into the industry. It became clear during the schemes, that the fleet segments with the highest 
average licence-plus-vessel values were the least represented among the vessels successfully decommissioned. Given 
the current level of licence-prices, a tender-based decommissioning scheme, even based on EC maximum rates34 
would now be likely to remove few vessels from the most profitable fleet segments. 
 Whether the recent growth in quota-trading will start to have a significant effect on fleet capacity remains to be 
seen. Nevertheless, there are indications at least that the ability of many within the industry to separate quota and 
licence may result in a rationalisation of capacity. 
 For example, licences are currently allowed to lie unused as entitlements for 3 years. A number of vessel-
owners have sold vessels, and for 2 years at least are renting their quotas, while keeping their licences and deciding 
whether to replace the vessels or leave the industry all together. In addition, the few deals that have taken place in the 
pelagic sector within the last 3 years have seen quota divided, in several cases, between purchasers. This is certainly 
having at least a  short-term effect on capacity, as the licences are currently unused while the quota is being caught by 
others. 
 
                                                 
34 See Annex III (point 1.1) to Council Regulation 3699/93 (OJ No L 346, 31.12.93, p1) as amended by Council Regulation 
1624/95 (OJ No L 155, 6.7.95, p1). 
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Table 11 
Changes in UK fleet capacity 1997-9 
Fleet segment  Situation  
at 1.1.97 
Situation 
at 31.12.99 
% 
change 
GT 37 453 47 661 27% Pelagic trawl and purse 
seines Kw 71 876 77 209 7% 
GT 28 240 24 498 -13% Beam trawl 
kW 117 616 91 417 -22% 
GT 116 581 116 752 0% Demersal trawls, seines 
and Nephrops trawls kW 400 127 357 128 -11% 
GT 16 431 15 046 -8% Netters, liners and other 
static gears kW 51 977 43 968 -15% 
GT 11 766 12 317 5% Shellfish mobile 
kW 55 648 52 607 -5% 
GT 6 413 6 443 0% Shellfish fixed 
kW 44 463 43 353 -2% 
GT 15 567 16 664 7% Distant-water 
kW 25 400 25 015 -2% 
GT 20 120 20 309 1% Small-scale coastal 
(<10m) kW 286 367 288 239 1% 
GT 252 571 259 812 3% Total 
kW 1 054 474 979 473 -7% 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The operation of a series of annual decommissioning schemes during the 1990s, and the changing nature of the 
possibilities for quota-trading under the UK’s quota-management system, makes it difficult to attribute any changes 
in the size and capacity of the fleet to the emergence of transferable quota rights. From the figures that are available, 
the licence market did, however, contribute to the reduction in fleet size that was observed during the course of the 
decommissioning schemes. 
 Nevertheless, as might be expected, there are signs that the huge growth in quota-trading in the last couple of 
years may be starting to lead to some rationalisation of fleet capacity, if yet on a relatively small scale. Whether there 
will be a significant rationalisation in the future depends on the direction taken by the Government policy on quota-
rights, and hence on the subsequent characteristics of the quota-market as well as the efficiency of quota-
enforcement. 
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